The effect of corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate governance on aggressive tax action by Adiputra, I Made Pradana et al.
Journal of Economics, Business, and Accountancy Ventura Vol. 22, No. 2, August - November 2019, pages 237 – 247 
237 
The effect of corporate social responsibility disclosure and 
corporate governance on aggressive tax action 
I Made Pradana Adiputra1*, Dwi Martani2, I Putu Hendra Martadinata3 
1,3 Universitas Pendidikan Ganesha, Bali, Indonesia 
2 Universitas Indonesia, Depok, West Java, Indonesia 
A R T I C L E  I N F O
Article history: 
Received 13 June 2018 
Revised 2 October 2019 
Accepted 10 October 2019 
Available online 12 November 2019 
JEL Classification: 
G34; H26; M14 
Key words:  
Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Governance, Aggressive Tax Action 
DOI: 
10.14414/jebav.v22i2.1295 
A B S T R A C T
This study aims to analyze the effect of corporate social responsibility disclosure and 
corporate governance on aggressive tax action. This study analyzes corporate social 
responsibility disclosure based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), corporate 
governance analysis using ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard and 
measurement of aggressive tax action by using abnormal book tax difference 
(ABTD). It was conducted using secondary data in the  form of annual reports and 
financial statements of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-
2014. Sampling was done by purposive sampling, with nonprobability method. The 
sample was determined based on companies disclosing corporate social responsibility 
in accordance with content analysis on GRI4. The data were analyzed using 
regression analysis for testing the research model. It shows that the disclosure of 
corporate social responsibility negatively affects aggressive tax action. It also shows 
that corporate governance through corporate boards can reduce aggressive tax 
action, while the audit committee and internal audit have small effect on the 
tendency of aggressive tax action. This means the government can strengthen and 
enforce policies related to social responsibility and corporate governance to prevent 
tax aggressive behavior by companies. 
A B S T R A K
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh pengungkapan tanggung 
jawab sosial perusahaan dan tata kelola perusahaan pada tindakan pajak agresif. 
Penelitian ini menganalisis pengungkapan tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan ber-
dasarkan Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), analisis tata kelola perusahaan dengan 
menggunakan ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard dan pengukuran tindakan 
pajak agresif dengan menggunakan abnormal book tax difference (ABTD). Penelitian 
ini menggunakan data sekunder dalam bentuk laporan tahunan dan laporan keuangan 
perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia di 2012-2014. Pengambilan sampel 
dilakukan dengan purposive sampling, dengan metode nonprobability. Sampel diten-
tukan berdasarkan perusahaan yang mengungkapkan tanggung jawab sosial perus-
ahaan sesuai dengan analisis isi pada GRI4. Data dianalisis menggunakan analisis 
regresi untuk menguji model penelitian. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan, bahwa 
pengungkapan tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan secara negatif mempengaruhi tin-
dakan pajak yang agresif. Hasilnya juga menunjukkan, bahwa tata kelola perusahaan 
melalui dewan perusahaan dapat mengurangi tindakan pajak yang agresif, sedangkan 
komite audit dan audit internal memiliki pengaruh yang kecil terhadap kecenderungan 
tindakan pajak yang agresif. Hal berarti pemerintah dapat memperkuat dan 
menegakkan kebijakan yang terkait dengan tanggung jawab sosial dan tata kelola 
perusahaan untuk mencegah perilaku agresif pajak oleh perusahaan 
1. INTRODUCTION
Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 
Year 2007, on Limited Liability Company, Article 
74, states that companies in the form of limited 
liability companies, especially those that carry out 
their business activities related to natural resources, 
shall carry out social and environmental 
responsibility (Nadapdap 2012). Enterprises that do 
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not carry out their obligations relating to social and 
environmental responsibility shall be liable to 
sanctions in accordance with effective regulations. 
Furthermore, Regulation of the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number 47 Year 2012, on 
Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility 
of Limited Liability Company, Article 2, states that 
every company has social responsibility, and 
Article 7 states that companies that do not fulfill 
obligations related to social and environmental 
responsibility shall be subject to sanctions in 
accordance with the stipulated provision. 
Therefore, many companies now disclose their 
social and environmental information to the public 
although previous studies have shown that the 
reporting of environmental information by firms in 
Indonesia is still very low. The number is 
increasing year by year (Sarumpaet 2005).  
Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) state 
that companies and their owners prefer to take 
aggressive tax action by doing earnings 
management. Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) argue 
that aggressive tax action is an action aimed at 
lowering taxable profits through tax planning 
either by using a classified or unclassified tax 
evasion action. Kamila (2014) states that aggressive 
tax action can be bad for companies because it 
requires companies to report lower profits. This can 
damage the company's reputation in the eyes of 
stakeholders such as creditors, investors, and 
shareholders. Aggressive tax action by the 
company for the sake of achieving the goal of large 
profits has the opposite effect because it requires 
the companies to report lower profits (Kamila 
2014). Therefore, aggressive tax action also can be 
used to increase company’s profitabilites by paying 
lower tax. 
Desai  and  Dharmapala (2006)  argue  that  tax 
avoidance and managerial behavior can be 
complementary if tax avoidance reduces corporate 
transparency which, in turn, increases the 
opportunity for managers to divert company 
resources for personal gain. They said that 
companies with good governance have internal 
control mechanisms to prevent misappropriation, 
and argue that there is a negative relationship 
between equity incentives for managers and tax 
evasion. Conversely, poorly governed companies 
consider not to apply equity incentives to 
encourage tax evasion because they do not have 
governance mechanisms as a tool to prevent 
managerial abuse. Therefore, companies will able 
to increase equity incentives if they do not conduct 
aggressive tax action. 
Studies related to corporate social 
responsibility and taxation have been conducted by 
Lanis and Richardson (2011); Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006). They state that CSR negatively 
affects tax aggressiveness on listed companies in 
Australia. Angelina and Martani (2012) found that 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility 
negatively affects aggressive tax action. Hanlon and 
Slemrod (2009) found the market reacting 
negatively to news of tax avoidance measures, but 
more positive reactions to companies with better 
governance. Jiménez (2008) found an association 
between tax aggressiveness, tax environment 
(government regulations) and strong corporate 
governance through investor behavior. Sartori 
(2010) found that corporate governance has a 
positive influence on corporate taxation compliance 
rates, thus minimizing aggressive tax action. 
Minnick and Noga (2010) found that corporate 
governance negatively affects tax management. Sari 
and Martani (2010) found that corporate 
governance negatively affects aggressive tax 
actions. Mulyadi and Anwar (2015) found an 
empirical evidence that there is a significant 
negative impact of corporate governance to 
earnings management and tax management. 
Septiani and Martani (2014) study indicates that 
corporate governance assessment affects the 
abnormal book tax difference as a proxy of earnings 
management and tax management as an 
assessment of the board of directors and 
commissioners. Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, and 
Larcker (2015) suggest that attributes of governance 
are strongly linked to more extreme levels of tax 
evasion. Therefore, corporate social responsibility 
has an effect not only om earnings management, 
but also on tax management, tax evasion, as well as 
aggressive tax action. 
Related to aggressive tax actions literatures, 
the previous studies did not examine the effect of 
corporate governance factors on aggressive tax 
actions. For that reason, this study aims to analyze 
the effect of corporate responsibility disclosure and 
corporate governance on aggressive tax action. This 
research analizes the corporate social responsibility 
disclosure based on Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), corporate governance analysis using ASEAN 
Corporate Governance Scorecard, and aggressive 
tax action using abnormal book tax difference 
(ABTD) which is different from the previous 
researches. This research is not only to enrich the 
tax literature with the Indonesian context, but it is 
also expected to be a consideration for the investors 
in making investment decision, for companies in 
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providing corporate social responsibility 
information, corporate governance mechanism, and 
the stakeholders, stockholders and tax authoroities, 
for aggressive tax action. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HY-
POTHESES 
Agency Problem 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency 
relationship as a contract when one or more people 
(the owner or principal) engage in an agreement 
with another person (manager or agent) to do the 
owner's interests. Appropriate contracting to align 
the interests of agents and owners in the event of a 
conflict of interest is at the core of agency theory. 
Deegan  (2002 ), in the perspective of legitimacy 
theory, states that a company will voluntarily 
report its activities if management considers it as 
what the community expects.  
Lindblom (1994) suggests that, if an 
organization considers that its legitimacy is in 
question, it may adopt some aggressive strategy. A 
number of previous studies assessed the disclosure 
of annual reports and viewed the reporting of 
environmental and social information as a method 
used by organizations to respond to public 
pressure (Guthrie and Abeysekera 2006). Agency 
and legitimacy theory are closely related to the 
reporting of environmental disclosure, and also 
closely related to the use of content analysis 
methods as a measure of the reporting. Therefore, 
agency theory tries to minimize information 
asymmetry of environmental disclosure. By doing 
so, the companies will achieve legitimation from 
companies’ stakeholders or investors. Companies 
seem more likely to report their environmental 
disclosure if they have a particular need to do so. 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
The definition of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) according to the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is a continuing 
commitment by businesses to act ethically and 
contribute to the economic development of the local 
community or society at large, along with 
improving the lives of its workers and their whole 
family (Kastutisari and Dewi 2014). A typical CSR 
report contains lots of information, such as 
expenditures related to environmental protection 
and climate change, charitable contributions, and 
employee benefits - all of which are not normally 
reported in the financial statements but have 
significant implications for the company's value 
(Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang 2014). Some CSR 
projects directly imply positive cash flow for the 
future of the company (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). For 
that reason, CSR is the businesses’ commitment to 
act ethically. This business should contribute to the 
local community development. Besides that, CSR 
contains the company’s report that shows 
company’s values with the positive cash flow for its 
future.  
Aggressive Tax Action 
In corporate dimension, the taxes deposited by the 
company to the government are the cost to the firm. 
The existence of these costs will result in reduced 
cash available to the company and shareholders 
that of course are not favored by the company or its 
shareholders. Therefore, to avoid the reduction of 
available cash, a tax-reducing act through 
aggressive tax activity will tend to be favored by 
companies and shareholders (Chen et al. 2010). 
Attempts to minimize this tax burden can 
result in aggressive tax reporting (Hanlon and 
Slemrod 2009). This opinion is supported by 
research conducted by Chen et al. (2010), stating 
that there is a preference that corporate 
management has to take aggressive tax action. 
According to Frank et al. (2009), aggressive tax 
action is an action aimed at lowering taxable profits 
through tax planning, either using a classified or 
unclassified tax evasion action. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) state that companies 
conductingaggressive tax acts suffer from the 
following condition: (1). The existence of a 
company may be subject to punishment from the 
tax authorities due to the discovery of frauds that 
may occur during the audit process, (2). The loss of 
corporate reputation due to audit by tax agencies, 
(3). The decline in stock prices due to the 
assumption from the shareholders that aggressive 
tax actions undertaken by managers is a rent 
extraction action that can harm shareholders. 
Kamila (2014) states that the main purpose of 
aggressive taxation is to minimize the corporate tax 
burden. The tax expense is derived from 
multiplying the taxable income with the tax rate 
established by the state. The taxable income is 
derived from company profits minus tax correction. 
The tax expense incurred by a company depends 
on the tax correction or the difference between the 
profit and the taxable income (book-tax difference). 
Therefore, the technique of aggressive taxes is to 
manage the book-tax difference. 
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Corporate Governance 
Potential conflicts of interest between principal and 
agent as well as the government and companies, 
can be addressed through good corporate 
governance. Corporate Governance is a mechanism 
used to ensure that the owner of the fund, such as 
shareholders and lenders of the company receives a 
return from the activities run by the manager, or in 
other words, how the owner of the fund exercises 
control to the managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
The definition of corporate governance by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) is a structure consisting of 
shareholders, board of directors, and management, 
which relate to each other and are responsible for 
improving the company's performance in achieving 
its objectives. The Indonesian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (IICG), on its website, defines 
corporate governance as a set of mechanisms to 
guide and control a company so that its operation 
goes according to the expectations of its 
stakeholders. Some of the measurements of 
corporate governance are based on institutional 
ownership by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) in the 
US, non-executive directors and institutional 
ownership by Wahab and Holland (2012) in the 
UK, family versus non-family by Chen et al. (2010) 
in Indonesia, duality CEOs, size boards, 
independent directors by Khaoula and Ali (2012) in 
Tunisia, and the effectiveness of the board of 
commissioners and the effectiveness of the audit 
committee in monitoring the company's operations 
by Hermawan (2009) in Indonesia. 
Based on the description above, corporate 
government deals with the effort of making sure 
that the fund is managed and controlled so that all 
the stakeholders are also responsible for the 
company’s performance for achieving the 
objectives they defined. 
Book Tax Difference 
Kamila (2014) states that the main purpose of the 
aggressive tax is to minimize the company's tax 
burden. The tax expense incurred by a company 
depends on the tax correction or the difference 
between the profit and the taxable income (book-
tax difference). Book-tax difference consists of two 
components namely permanent differences and 
temporary differences. The permanent difference is 
the substantive difference between accounting 
profit and fiscal profit so that this difference will 
occur forever. Basically this difference arises 
because of the policy of the tax authorities so that it 
becomes an incentive for taxpayers (Zain 2008). The 
temporary difference is the difference in the time of 
revenue recognition or expense according to 
accounting and taxes, so in total there is no 
difference, but in one period there are differences. 
Research conducted by Hanlon and Shevlin 
(2005) found that large book-tax differences (LBTD) 
has a negative effect on earnings relevance. 
Investors interpret a large book-tax difference as an 
indication that the company is conducting earnings 
management and tax evasion that negatively affects 
the earnings relevance. Tang and Firth (2011) study 
that covered the weaknesses of Hanlon and Shevlin 
(2005). (Tang and Firth 2011) use an estimated 
model called the normal book-tax difference 
(NBTD) which is a book-tax difference derived 
from differences in regulation and abnormal book-
tax difference (ABTD) that derived from earnings 
management and tax evasion. 
Hypotheses 
This study examines the existence of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure practices and 
corporate governance mechanisms that will reduce 
the aggressive tax actions by analyzing the 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility and the 
role of corporate governance against the tendency 
of companies to take aggressive tax action 
(Angelina and Martani 2012; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2006; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Lanis 
and Richardson 2011; Minnick and Noga 2010; 
Mulyadi and Anwar 2015; Sari and Martani 2010; 
Septiani and Martani 2014). Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is an activity that reflects good 
corporate governance. This is the implementation 
of agency theory as corporate responsibility to 
investors. Companies that do a lot of social 
responsibility activities mean that companies 
implement the corporate governance, so they will 
be obedient to the provisions of the regulation as a 
form of the consequences of getting legitimacy. 
Associated with taxes, companies that engage in 
social responsibility and corporate governance 
activities are expected to have low aggressive tax 
actions.  
Corporate social responsibilities is basically a 
form of corporate responsibilityies related to 
environmental protection and climate change, 
charitable contributions, and employee welfare and 
other things that are usually not reported in 
financial statements but have significant 
implications for the company’s value (Dhaliwal et 
al. 2014). The company's openness to CSR activities 
will finally affect tax aggressive actions. Dhaliwal et 
al. (2014) mention that CSR projects directly have 
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implications for positive cash flow for the 
company's future. On the contrary, companies that 
do not report their CSR activities will have the 
opposite effect on tax aggressive actions. Thus, the 
first hypothesis proposed in this study is. 
H1: The degree of social responsibility disclosure has a 
negative effect on the corporate's aggressive tax 
action 
Corporate governance mechanisms are created 
by shareholders to encourage effective and efficient 
company management (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Besides that, Siagian, Siregar, and Rahadian (2013) 
states that the application of good corporate 
governance can reduce agency costs reducing the 
cost of capital as a result of good company 
management. According to Hermawan (2009), 
corporate operational monitoring in Indonesia 
causes companies not to try to take actions that will 
harm stakeholders or investors. In this case, the 
company's steps to reduce the payment of the 
amount of tax will be avoided through the 
implementation of good corporate governance. 
Based on such arguments, it can be stated that good 
corporate government can reduce the aggressive 
tax actions. For that reason, the second hypothesis 
proposed in this study is: 
H2: Good corporate governance has a negative effect on 
corporate’s aggressive tax actions 
It is important to control include other factors 
that can control aggressive tax actions and also 
other factors that can control other variables. For 
example, tax and accounting difference variables 
that have been studied are included. By doing so, 
the expected variability of aggressive tax action 
observed can occur because of CSR disclosure level. 
The control variables used in this study are 
company size, leverage, liquidity, and return on 
assets. Company size is used as a control variable 
because larger firm sizes typically perform more 
aggressive tax actions compared to smaller firms 
because they have greater economic and political 
power compared to the smaller firms (Lanis and 
Richardson 2011). Leverage has a positive 
relationship with corporate tax aggressiveness 
through tax-deductible interest payments 
(Angelina and Martani 2012). Liquidity is used as a 
control variable because the size of the company's 
financial condition can trigger companies to 
disobey tax rules that can lead to aggressive tax 
action. And finally, return on asset is used as a 
control variable to control the companies’ growth.  
3. RESEARCH METHOD
This research was conducted by using secondary 
data in the form of annual report and company 
financial report which are listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) over 2013-2015. These secondary 
data were taken from the Pusat Data Ekonomi dan 
Bisnis (PDEB) FEUI (the Center of Economics and 
Business Data) Economics Faculty of Universitas 
Indonesia, the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
web-site and the company website of the related 
companies. It took the sample using a purposive 
sampling technique, with non-probability method. 
It was due to the limited annual reports of the listed 
companies over 2013-2015. Then, the researcher 
determined the number of the sample based on 
companies that conducted corporate social 
responsibility disclosure in accordance with content 
analysis on GRI4. 
Table 1 
Sample Distribution of Companies by Industrial Sector (GRI4) 
Industrial Sector Total Companies Percentage 
Construction and Real Estate 16 30.19% 
Food Processing 12 22.64% 
Media 3 5.67% 
Oil and Gas 2 3.77% 
Electric Utilities 5 9.43% 
Mining and Metals 15 28.30% 
Total 53 100% 
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Here is the research model used in this study: 
TaxAgit = α + α1CSRDit + α2CGit + α3Sizeit + 
α4Levit + α5Liqit + α6ROAit + εit …. (1) 
Notes: 
TaxAg : Corporate tax aggressiveness 
CSRD : CSR disclosure GRI index 
CG : Assessment of corporate governance 
Size : Natural logarithm of total assets 
Lev : long term debt divided by total assets 
Liq : number of share traded/total outstanding 
share 
ROA : Profit before tax divided by total assets 
Dependent variable in this research is ABTD. 
ABTD is measured by the residual estimation of the 
BTD model. BTD model is a model of (Manzon and 
Plesko 2002). The model includes: 
BTDit = β0+ β1ΔINVit + β2ΔREVit + β3NOLit +
β4TLUit + β5ΔEBit + εit  ……………… (2) 
Notes: 
BTD : book-tax differences for company in 
Year-t 
ΔINVRit : changes in investment in both fixed 
assets and intangible assets in the 
company from year t-1 to year-t 
ΔREVRit : changes in corporate income from year 
t-1 to year-t 
NOLit  : the accounting value of net operating 
losses 
TLUit  : value of tax losses utilized company i 
in Year-t 
ΔEBRit  : changes in companies’ employee 
benefit of the year t-1 to year-t 
The independent variables in this research are: 
(1) CSRD, is the level of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure through corporate social 
responsibility disclosure items based on Global 
Reporting Initiatives (GRI) 4 with 58 items of 
disclosure including: strategy and analysis (G4-1 
and G4-2), organizational profile (G4-3 to G4-16), 
material and identified boundary aspects (G4-17 to 
G4-23), stakeholder relations (G4-24 to G4-27), 
report profiles (G4-28 to G4-33), governance ( G4-34 
to G4-55) and ethics and integrity (G4-56 to G4-58). 
Score 1 if item is disclosed and 0 if item not 
disclosed. CSR score = (total CSR score / 58) x 
100%; (2) CG, is the performance assessment of the 
Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors 
(BOARD), Audit Committee (AC), and Internal 
Audit (AI); (3) Size, is the size of the company 
calculated by using natural logarithm of total 
assets; (4) Leverage, is a financing activity that 
comes from debt that has an important role and 
usually the lender asks for a more complete 
disclosure to the borrowing company (Leftwich 
1981) and it is considered important in the 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility. 
Leverage is calculated by: long term debt divided 
by total assets; (5) Liquidity, calculated by: number 
share traded / total outstanding share; and (6) 
ROA, calculated by: profit before tax divided by 
total assets.  
Prior to testing the research model, classical 
assumption test, such as multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity were conducted. 
Multicollinearity test is aimed at determining 
whether there is a correlation between independent 
variables in the regression model (Ghozali 2012). 
Multicollinearity detection is conducted by 
calculating tolerance values and Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF). The common cut off value used to 
indicate Multicolinearity is a tolerance value of ≤ 
0.10 or equal to VIF value ≥10 (Ghozali 2012).  
The heteroscedasticity test aims to determine 
whether there is a variance inequality of one 
residual observation to another observation in the 
regression model (Ghozali 2012). Heteroscedasticity 
test is presented through scatter plot to determine 
whether there is a pattern seen from the 
distribution of data. If the pattern on the picture 
does not show any indication to form a certain 
pattern then there is no heteroscedasticity and vice 
versa. The testing of research model is done by 
using multiple regression analysis with error rate 
5% using SPSS analysis. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation 
TaxAgr (ABTD) -0.106 1.013 -0.936 0.168 
CSRD 0.158 0.570 0.020 0.093 
Board 0.309 0.580 0.120 0.077 
Audit 
committee 0.606 
1.000 0.100 0.206 
Internal Audit 0.514 0.670 0.000 0.183 
Size 21.929 25.130 18.060 1.534 
Lev 0.209 0.740 0.000 0.187 
Liq 1.386 6.300 0.000 1.386 
ROA 26.623 32.660 21.340 3.461 
Samples 159 159 159 159 
Description: This table presents the results of statistical descriptive tests. Dependent variable in this 
research is ABTD, measured by the residual estimation of the BTD model. BTD model is a model of 
Manzon and Plesko (2002). The independent variable is CSRD that is the level of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure through corporate social responsibility disclosure items based on Global 
Reporting Initiatives (GRI) 4. CG is the value of corporate governance based on CG Scorecard. Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is calculated by the formula of long term debt divided by 
total assets. Liquidity is calculated by the formula of number share traded / total outstanding share. 
ROA is calculated by the formula of profit before tax divided by total assets. 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The sample consists of the companies that 
disclose their corporate social responsibility 
according to content analysis at GRI4. Descriptive 
statistics of research data is shown in Table 2. 
As presented on Table 2, it can be seen that the 
average ABTD indicated by negative value with the 
standard deviation for ABTD is 16.82%, which 
indicates that the range of ABTD values is quite 
large. Maximum (minimum) ABTD value is 1.012 (-
0.936). The average of BOARD value is 0.309, 
indicating that the board and commissioners' 
assessments are still low. For the maximum 
(minimum) BOARD value is 0.580 (0.120). The 
Audit Committee variable shows that the audit 
committee's assessment aver-age value is 0.607, 
with the maximum (minimum) value being 1 and 
0.1 indicating a perfect value and 0 indicating that 
there are still companies that have not yet 
established an audit committee.  
For internal audit variables show the average 
value of 0.4514, and the maximum and minimum 
values respectively are 0.67 and 0, it means the 
existence of Internal Audit is good enough but 
there are companies that do not have internal audit. 
The SIZE variable shows the company's assets with 
an average value of 21.927, while the maximum 
(minimum) value is 25.130 (18.060). The LEV 
variable shows the funding source of the company 
with an average value of 0.209 and the maximum 
(minimum) value is 0.740 (0.000). The Liq variable 
indicates that the firm's cash capability shows the 
aver-age value of 0.731 and the maximal 
(minimum) value is 6.300 (0.000). For ROA variable 
showing profit-ability of company with average 
value of 26.623 and maximum value (minimum) is 
32.660 (21.340). 
Prior to testing the research model with 
regression analysis, classical assumption test 
(multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity) was 
conducted. It was found that there is no 
relationship between the independent variables 
and the VIF (values were all below the value of 10). 
For heteroedasticity testing using the Glejser Test, it 
showed that the residual variant for all 
observations in the regression model did not 
contain the symptoms of heteroscedasticity. It can 
be seen that the significance value of all 
independent variables are more than 0.05. So it is 
concluded that there is no problem of 
heteroscedasticity on regression model. The 
regression results of re-search model can be seen on 
Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Regression Results 
Expected Sign Coefficient Significance VIF 
CSRD - -0.210 0.038** 1.309 
Board - -0.421 0.025** 1.291 
AC - -0.035 0.618 1.273 
AI - -0.001 0.985 1.283 
Size - -0.220 0.016** 1.170 
Lev + 0.328 0.000** 1.226 
Liq ? 0.012 0.230 1.228 
ROA ? 0.007 0.085 1.094 
Constant ? 0.073 0.737 
Adjusted R-square 0.101 
F-test Sign (F-statistic) 0.002** 
N 159 
** Significant at level 5% 
Description: This table presents the estimation of research model for testing hypotheses 1 and 2. The 
dependent variable in this research is ABTD. ABTD was measured by residual estimation of BTD 
model using Manzon and Plesko model (2002). The independent variable is CSRD which is the level of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure through corporate social responsibility disclosure items based 
on Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) 4. Firm size was calculated by the formula of natural logarithm of 
total assets. Leverage was calculated by the formula of long term debt divided by total assets. Liquidity 
was calculated by the formula of number of share traded divided by total outstanding share. ROA was 
calculated by the formula of profit before tax divided by total assets. 
Based on Table 3, it can be explained that: 
1. Social responsibility disclosure  has a  negative  effect
on corporate’s aggressive tax actions 
Regression results indicate that the disclosure of 
corporate social responsibility negatively affects 
aggressive tax action. The disclosure of corporate 
social responsibility will reduce the aggressive tax 
action because the company's funds are used for 
such social responsibility activities. As for leverage, 
as a source of corporate funding, the result of this 
study indicates that the source of the funding 
obtained by the company is used for activities that 
provide benefits for the company through corporate 
social responsibility, so that the company is 
considered good by the public, especially by the 
investors. This may reduce any aggressive tax action 
that may be came from such funding sources. 
Based on agency theory, stakeholders are aware 
of the need for information in the financial 
statements of corporate activities that can add value 
to the company. This value can be attained through 
social responsibility that can provide benefits to 
principals, agents and stakeholders. Principal wants 
to know all the company’s information including 
management activities related to their investment in 
the company. Therefore it is necessary to evaluate 
the agents or managers’ performance on these 
investments in the financial statements that also 
have a positive impact for stakeholders, especially 
for the community for social responsibilities done by 
the company. Based on legitimacy theory, social 
responsibility is done through restrictions by 
regulation, values, and reaction of the company to 
care about the environment. Activities that benefit 
companies, communities and governments will add 
values (profit) for the company, prosperity for 
society and the value of investment for the 
government. The theory of legitimacy states that 
companies are continually seeking ways to ensure 
their operations are within the limits and norms that 
apply in society (social contracts). 
The results of this study are in line with the 
research conducted by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
and Lanis and Richardson (2011) showing that CSR 
negatively affects tax aggressiveness, while this 
research  is  not  in  line  with  Angelina  and  Martani 
(2012) that disclosure of corporate social responsibility 
positively affects tax aggressiveness.  
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2. Good corporate governance has a negative effect on
corporate’s aggressive tax actions
Regression results indicate that corporate gov-
ernance through ASEAN CG scorecard measure-
ment in the research samples negatively affects ag-
gressive tax action, although it is only shown from 
the existence of board of commissioners (board). 
Board variable coefficient is -0421 with a 
significance of 0.025. The findings prove that 
corporate governance through corporate boards can 
reduce aggressive tax action by companies. 
Meanwhile, for internal audit and audit committees, 
they do not perform significant effect on aggressive 
tax action tendencies, because its task is limited to 
the co-administration task for the board of 
commissioners in monitoring the company's 
performance and other financial information 
(Hermawan 2009). In addition, they are tasked to 
maintain the company's compliance with relevant 
regulations as well as the effectiveness of the 
company's internal controls and activities. Likewise, 
for the finding that internal auditors do not affect 
aggressive tax action. This is due to their tasks that 
are limited only to company's annual audit program 
and other related matters in the audit program. 
The agency theory states that the best way to 
manage the relationship between principal and 
agent is required. The concept of separation of 
ownership and control becomes very important to 
anticipate the existence of the difference of interest 
be-tween principal and agent especially related to 
financial reporting that impacts the corporate tax 
reporting.  
In the perspective of legitimacy theory, a 
company will report its activities if management 
considers that this is what the community expects. In 
other words, the value system used by the company 
for its operational activities must be in accordance 
with the value system in society. This will impact on 
how the company runs its governance for 
sustainability so that it will get a positive response 
from the community and can increase the value of 
the company. 
The results of this study are in line with Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006), Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), 
Jiménez (2008), Sartori (2010), Minnick and Noga 
(2010), Sari and Martani (2010), Mulyadi and Anwar 
(2015), Septiani and Martani (2014), Armstrong et al. 
(2015) showing that the attributes of governance has 
a strong relationship with a more extreme level on 
tax evasion. In other words, corporate governance 
negatively affects aggressive tax action by the 
company. Therefore, better governance has proved 
to decrease aggressive tax action. 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This study aims to analyze the effect of 
corporate social responsibility and corporate 
governance disclosure on aggressive tax action. 
The results also show that the level of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure has a negative effect 
on corporate aggressive tax action. In turn, good 
corporate governance has a negative effect on 
corporate aggressive tax action. This implies that 
the existence of corporate social responsibility and 
corporate governance as a mechanism for the 
company not only generate eco-nomic value for 
shareholders and stakeholders but also to 
effectively prevent the aggressive tax action of the 
company.  
Some limitations need to be put forward so 
that in the future, the study can be done carefully 
by considering these limitations. In addition, 
research limitations are useful for the development 
of similar research in the future. The limitations in 
this study are as follows: (1) Aggressive tax action 
in this study was measured by using BTD model 
regression to obtain the value of ABTD from 
previous studies influenced by the factors that exist 
in the studies. Current studies use Effective Tax 
Rate (ITR) as proxy for aggressive tax action; (2) 
The measurement of corporate governance based 
on ASEAN CG Scorecard is limited to the 
information in the company's annual report, so 
there is a possibility that the data did not indicate 
the actual conditions of the companies being 
researched. Therefore, ASEAN CG Scorecard is 
more comprehensive measurement for corporate 
governance. 
Future research is suggested to address the 
limitations of this study by: (1) Analyzing the 
ABTD by adding the other factors affecting the 
ABTD such as the book-tax differences of previous 
periods and foreign operations; and (2) Using the 
instrument of corporate governance in ASEAN CG 
scorecard, coupled with other sources in addition 
to the annual report of the company through other 
publications. These publications are related to 
corporate governance disclosed by the company to 
complement the corporate governance mechanisms 
information. 
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